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Roberto Granieri, *Systems of Predication. Aristotle's Categories in Topics, I, 9*

In this paper I investigate Aristotle's account of predication in *Topics, I, 9*. I argue for the following interpretation. In this chapter Aristotle (i) presents two systems of *predication* cutting across each other, the system of the so-called four 'predicables' and of the ten 'categories', in order to distinguish them and explore their mutual relationship. I propose a *semantic* interpretation of the relationship between them. According to this reading, every proposition formed through a predicable constitutes at the same time a predication according to one of the ten categories, and, consequently, *signifies* one of them, expressing one of the predicative relationship conveyed by them. Further, Aristotle (ii) explains the predicative connection between these two systems and the ten items signified by the 'things said without any combination' enumerated in Chapter 4 of the *Categories*, whose list is almost identical with that of categories in *Top.*, I, 9, with the only exception of their first members.

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Michael J. Griffin, *Why Philosophy Begins with the Categories : Perspectives from the 1st-century Greek Commentators*

In this paper, I briefly introduce the ancient Neoplatonic commentators' view that the *Categories* rightly introduces Aristotelian philosophy. I then offer several arguments for dating this view back to the earlier, first-century BCE commentators on the *Categories*, particularly Andronicus of Rhodes and his follower Boethus of Sidon. (1) First, Andronicus developed a catalogue that places the *Categories* at the outset of the reading curriculum. (2) Second, Andronicus argued that philosophy should begin with demonstration (*apodeixis*). (3) Third, he argued that the *Categories* focused on demonstration, and not on dialectic (in the *Topics* sense). (4) Fourth, he developed an account of how the *Categories* helps to excavate

and articulate a beginning student's preconceptions (*prolēpseis*), and how it is therefore pedagogically valuable for the beginner.

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Riccardo Chiaradonna, *Are There Qualities in Intelligible Being? On Plotinus VI.2 [43] 14*

The present article provides a detailed commentary on Plotinus VI.2 [43] 14. This chapter raises some difficult questions concerning the status of quality in Plotinus' metaphysics. Recent interpretations suggest that Plotinus here distinguishes two levels in intelligible *ousia* and that he expresses this distinction through a qualified use of the distinction between constituent and accidental qualities (see L. Lavaud, *The Primary Substance in Plotinus' Metaphysics: A Little-Known Concept*, «Phronesis», 59, 2014, pp. 369-384). This distinction had been developed in the commentary tradition on Aristotle's *Categories* and Plotinus focuses on it in treatises II.6 [17] and VI.1 [42]. As a matter of fact, such a reading is unpersuasive. In VI.2 [43] 14 Plotinus does not transpose and adapt the classification of qualities into his account of intelligible being. Rather, he shows that quality is not one of the greatest genera or kinds that define the structure of the Intellect. So the greatest genera are neither accidental qualities nor constituent properties of intelligible being. Furthermore, Plotinus argues that the distinctive type of multiplicity in the Intellect cannot in any way be expressed through the distinction between subject and property, and this because at the level of intelligible being all multiplicity is substantial and completely internal.

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Mereike Hauer, *The notion of ἐπιτηδεϊότης in Simplicius' discussion of quality*

This paper deals with the meaning and function of ἐπιτηδεϊότης in Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Categories*, particularly in chapter 8, the discussion of the category of quality. Based on the question as to whether Simplicius uses ἐπιτηδεϊότης as a technical term or as a mere substitute for the Aristotelian notion of δύναμις, different passages of chapter 8 will be analyzed and compared with Aristotle's discussion of δύναμις. It will be argued that Simplicius distinguishes between two sens-

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es of ἐπιτηδειότης of which one sense can be associated with the Aristotelian notion of δύναμις; the other sense, however, differs from the Aristotelian notion of δύναμις and, instead, appears to be in agreement with the use of ἐπιτηδειότης in the theory of participation established by Simplicius' Neoplatonic predecessors.

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Hamid Taieb, *Classifying Knowledge and Cognates: On Aristotle's Categories, 8, 11a20-38 and Its Early Reception*

Can one and the same thing, in Aristotle, belong to two distinct categories? In view of Chapters 7 and 8 of the *Categories*, the answer seems to be affirmative : habits and dispositions, including knowledge, are both relatives and qualities. At the end of Chapter 8 of the treatise, Aristotle tackles this problem of dual categorization and gives two solutions meant to solve it. These solutions have been criticized by some modern interpreters. Aristotle's early commentators, notably the Greek Neoplatonists and Boethius, had a different stance : they tried, more charitably, to render both solutions plausible. In this paper, I will present the above-mentioned problem of dual categorization in Aristotle and its discussion by the early commentators of the *Categories*.

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Alessandro D. Conti, *Relations and Relatives in Boethius's Commentary on the Categories : the Invention of Monadic Two-place Predicates*

That of *ad aliquid* is the most problematic category among the ten listed by Aristotle in the homonymous treatise. In Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages many authors attempted to develop new formulations of the Aristotelian theory of relatives, since Aristotle's account of *ad aliquid* in the *Categories* is imprecise and incomplete. From a purely theoretic point of view, in Late Antiquity the most successful attempt to improve the Aristotelian doctrine was that of the Greek Neoplatonic commentators. They were able to elaborate a notion of relation (*schesis*) almost equivalent to a hypostatization of our modern notion of two-place predicates, as they conceived of relations as abstract forms whose distinctive feature was the

property of being present-in and joining two different substances at once. Yet, for the history of Medieval philosophy, far and away the most influential attempt to clarify Aristotle's text was that of Boethius, who, faithful to Aristotelian teaching, maintained that relation was an accident (we could say 'a property') which was-in a substance (its substrate of inherence) and simply entailed a reference to another, without inhering in it. Thus, unlike Greek Neoplatonic commentators of the *Categories* (and modern logicians as well), Boethius did not think of a relation as a two-place predicate, but he seems rather to consider it as a sort of *monadic two-place predicate*, or function. The difference between Boethius's conception and ours is that according to him each relation has only a place empty for individual variables and the other filled by an individual constant. The paper is aimed at clarifying the legacy Boethius left to the Medieval thinkers in relation to the theory of *ad aliquid*, namely the logical and terminological apparatus drawn up in order to solve the chief problems raised by the seventh chapter of the *Categories*, with the general interpretative context in which the apparatus itself was set.

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Paul Thom, *On logics of genus and differentia in the Aristotelian tradition*

The paper distinguishes different bodies of logical theory in Aristotle's writings on genus and differentia. It outlines some significant innovations introduced to the theory by Abelard and Avicenna. It sketches a family of intensional logics intended as formal representations of the various historical theories considered. This family is centred on a core theory that is neutral with respect to the differences between those historical theories, while the remaining members of the family give formal expression to the characteristic postulates and definitions adopted in specific historical theories. A research program is adumbrated for extending the paper's approach to other historical material.

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Silvia Di Vincenzo, *Avicenna's reworking of Porphyry's 'common accident' in the light of Aristotle's Categories*

The present paper deals with Avicenna's critical analysis of the third

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definition of ‘common accident’ that Porphyry provides in the *Isagoge*. The starting point for the present inquiry is chapter I.14 of Avicenna’s reworking of Porphyry’s *Isagoge* (*Kitab al-Madhal*) in the *Book of the Cure* (of which an English translation is provided in Appendix A). Firstly, Avicenna’s refutation of Porphyry’s definition of common accident (Porph., *Isag.*, 13.4-5 Busse) is examined in section I. Secondly, in section II the core doctrinal issue at stake in Avicenna’s refutation of that definition is presented, namely his distinction between the ontological accident (i.e. the *accident*) and the logical accident (i.e. the *accidental*). By way of conclusion, it will be argued that Avicenna’s reworking of the notion of ‘accident’ reveals, at the same time, awareness of the preceding and contemporary exegetical tradition, and a conscious detachment from it on the basis of an independent interpretation of Aristotle’s *Categories*.

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Niccolò Caminada, *A quotation of an anonymous ‘logician’ in Avicenna’s Categories*

This paper provides an analysis of chapter I, 3 of the *Maqūlāt* (‘Categories’) of Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Šifā* (*Book of the Cure*), devoted to the Aristotelian distinction between ‘being in a subject’ and ‘said of a subject’ (as traced in the second chapter of the *Categories*). The enquiry will focus on a literal quotation of an anonymous commentator, given by Avicenna in this chapter, which will be discussed extensively, in order to give plausible hypotheses concerning its source and authorship. Before coming to the text, a brief account of the Greek and Arabic background of the issues at stake will be given ; after discussing the quotation, the analysis will concentrate on Avicenna’s refutation of the commentator, which ultimately gives more than one clue to assess his identity. It will be argued that the quoted text is a translation or a paraphrase of a passage of Porphyry’s *In Aristotelis Categorias expositio per interrogationem et responsionem*, and the mentioned ‘logician’ is either Porphyry himself, or a later Arabic commentator rephrasing Porphyry’s text. An English translation of the second part of *Maqūlāt* I, 3 is given in the Appendix.

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Charles Girard, *The categories of action and passion in the Book of six principles and some of its commentaries*

The categories of acting and undergoing are not really examined in the Aristotelian treatise. This article aims at showing how the anonymous author of the *Book of six principles* analyses them in trying to fill this void. By doing so, the article underlines how this analysis philosophically relates to some technical problems discussed in the neo-platonician exegetic tradition of Aristotle's *Categories*. It makes reference to some thirteenth- and fourteenth- century commentaries on the *Book of six principles* both to present how this text was interpreted and to give a glance at how the conceptions of these two categories came to evolve.

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Heine Hansen, *A Book about Being: Anonymus Domus Petri 205 on Aristotle's Categories*

What is Aristotle's *Categories* about? The present article discusses an anonymous mid-thirteenth-century Latin commentary on the text, whose author argues, in open opposition to most medieval commentators, that the text is simply about being (*ens*). First, a brief introduction to the commentary is given. Then, the commentator's explicit rejection of the standard medieval answer to the question and his own stated view are discussed. Finally, an edition of the relevant, first part (*lectio*) of this hitherto unedited commentary is presented.

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Bruno Tremblay, *Albertus Magnus on the Problem of the Division of the Categories*

Albert the Great's attempt to systematically deduce the ten categories identified by Aristotle (*sufficientia praedicamentorum*) has never been studied with any depth. In order to partly remedy this situation, the present article begins with a general consideration of Albert's understanding of key terms such as *praedicare*, *praedicabile* and *praedicamentum*, which gives us a better idea of what a logical category is for him and which leads to a discussion of how he saw the correspondence between the categorial

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system and extra-mental reality. It then examines some of the sources of Albert's *sufficientia*, which greatly facilitates the analysis of the derivation that constitutes the last section of the article.

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Magali Roques, *Quantification and Measurement of Qualities at the Beginning of the 14th Century. The Case of William of Ockham*

This paper critically examines the debate between William of Ockham and his contemporary Peter Auriol on how to account for the intension and remission of forms. Peter Auriol denies that an added degree of a quality such as the theological virtue of charity could be anything other than something which is neither a universal nor an individual and which cannot be grasped by intuition, but must be posited in order to account for the possibility that an accidental form can vary in intensity. Ockham aims at proving that Auriol's account is inconsistent. In my opinion, Ockham does not succeed, nor does he succeed in defending a consistent account of the metaphysics underlying the intension and remission of forms. Indeed, he conceives of the degree of a quality as a part of the intensified quality which, while being an individual that is really distinct from the quality and can be picked out, forms a unity with it in such a way that the union of the degree and the quality is itself an individual. Ockham fails to distinguish the notion of maximal resemblance holding between a quality's degree and the quality from the notion of maximal resemblance which holds between individuals of the same species. In the end, he is led to give up the idea that a degree is an individual that can be picked out in order to protect the core thesis of his nominalism about universals.

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Jenny Pelletier, *Walter Chatton on Categories*

Walter Chatton (c. 1290-1343), contemporary and fellow Franciscan of the considerably more famous William Ockham (c. 1285-1347), never wrote a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. He discussed a number of issues relating to categories in his *Lectura*, the second version of his com-

mentary on the Lombard's *Sentences*. In this paper, I argue that there are two central parts to Chatton's theory of categories : 1) an ontological part that establishes ten classes of entities and 2) a semantic part that focuses on ten categories of ordered concepts used to formulate the definitions of those entities. Following Scotus, Chatton holds a strong realist theory of categories according to which each category corresponds to a class of really distinct entities. What is unique to Chatton's discussion is the pivotal role of his so called 'anti-razor', which he uses to great effect in arguing for the existence of really distinct entities underlying all ten categories.

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Julie Brumberg-Chaumont, *Buridan on Substantial Singular Concepts*

Buridan's interpretation of the *Categories* involves the existence of singular substantial concepts. Yet recent scholarship has often associated singular concepts with a confuse cognition of the substance and its accidents, thereby precluding the existence of a concept that would be both singular and non connotative. We try to reconstruct what could be Buridan's solution by taking a fresh look on his *Questions on Metaphysics* so far neglected or insufficiently explored. These are the question 17 on book VII, which states that it is possible to impose names on individual substances and individuals accidents separately, and the question 19, where Buridan says that demonstratives pronouns signify only the substance and can be used independently of an actual demonstration, thereby suggesting a «non indexical» use that would free pronouns (and initial imposition of proper names to substances) from any associated accidents, even the accidental situation of demonstration.

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Francesco Di Giacomo, *Thinking and interpreting reality : John Buridan's Commentary on the Categories*

Buridan's theory of categories must be viewed as one of the most interesting output of the Nominalist interpretative tradition after Ockham. Whereas the semantics that Ockham wished to construct was a sort of for-

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mal language, Buridan rather directed his efforts towards building up a semantics as a sort of empirical analysis of our language. For him, to understand an expression is not merely to be aware of the entity (or entities) somehow connected with it, but also to be aware of its actual or potential use. Again, unlike Ockham, who affirmed that spoken and written terms directly signify the (individual) things in the world, Buridan follows Boethius and states that the direct meaning of any expression is a conceptual entity in the mind. Given the main goal of this paper, namely to study and clarify the most important semantic aspects of Buridan's theory of categories (as, for example, his conception of essential predication), these assumptions are explained in accordance with some crucial questions from Buridan's commentaries on the *De anima*, so that the general features of his theory of cognition can be drawn, and particularly the way in which our mind produces universals concept and builds up the categorical fields.

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