ABSTRACTS

Andrea Falcon, *The Early Reception of Aristotle’s Categories: Comments on Michael Griffin*, Aristotle’s *Categories* in the Early Roman Empire pp. 1-12

Griffin’s book provides a compelling narrative to tell the intricate story of the rediscovery of the *Categories* and its subsequent appropriation by philosophers working in different traditions between Andronicus of Rhodes (first century BC) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (late second and early third century AD). Andronicus is clearly the hero in this story. By placing the logical writings at the outset of the Aristotelian corpus, and the *Categories* at the head of the logical writings, Andronicus gave a prominent position to this hitherto obscure work. But a slightly different story could be told. In this alternative story, the focus is shifted away from Andronicus of Rhodes in order to concentrate on Boethus of Sidon (first century BC) and his important contribution to the reception of the *Categories* in the ancient commentary tradition.

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Stephen Menn, *Andronicus and Boethius: Reflections on Michael Griffin’s Aristotle’s Categories* in the Early Roman Empire pp. 13-44

Griffin, Rashed, and Chiaradonna have shown how we can use Simplicius’ *Categories* commentary to reconstruct much of Porphyry’s greater *Categories* commentary (also witnessed by the Archimedes Palimpsest), and then use this to reconstruct much of the work of Boethus, and to a lesser extent Andronicus, on the *Categories*. In some cases building on Griffin, in other cases disagreeing with him, I bring out some ways in which Andronicus and Boethus differ from most later interpreters; this can help us understand Alexander’s and Porphyry’s responses. I reconstruct (i) Andronicus’ interpretation of ‘in’ and ‘said of’, which is based on Aristotle’s distinction between abstract nouns and paronymous concrete nouns, and avoids the metaphysical freight that later interpreters load onto the notion of ‘said of’; (ii) Boethus’ use of *De Interpretatione* 1 to explain how a universal term can be synonymous without positing either universals in re or Stoic λακτύ, and the consequences he draws for the different aims of the *Categories* and *De Interpretatione*; and (iii) Boethus’ solution to the tension between Aristotle’s hylomorphism and the *Categories*’ account of substance. Boethus, unlike later interpreters, thinks the form is in the matter, and is therefore not a substance but (typically) a quality, but that it is nonetheless able to constitute the composite as a substance distinct from the matter. I bring out the Aristotelian basis for Boethus’ reading, connect it with Boethus’ accounts of differentiae and of the soul, and show how Boethus’ views help motivate Porphyry’s responses. In some cases Porphyry constructs his views by triangulating between Boethus and Alexander.

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Davide Del Forno, *Proclus on the Hypothetical Method and the Concept of ἰδιότης ἰδιότης* pp. 45-58

In this paper I show the close link between Proclus’ theory of knowledge and his dynamic and reticular conception of reality. If, as the dialectical procedure indicates, the essence of any given object can only be known by showing its connections with (all) other objects, this is because the ontological identity of every object depends on its being part of a network and a hierarchy of relationships to other objects. Within this orderly structure, which coincides
with reality, every object is seen not as something isolated and immobile, but as a receptor and an agent. It is at the same time the effect of the action of hierarchically superior objects, which transmit their ‘property’ or ‘peculiarity’ (idiotes) to it, and the cause of hierarchically inferior objects, to which it transmits its property (or peculiarity).

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Marina Schwark, *Simplicius and Iamblichus on Shape (μορφή)*, 59-88

The present article examines how Simplicius and Iamblichus conceive of the quality *shape* (μορφή) and its relation to other qualities. As Simplicius’ commentary on *Categories* 8 shows, Simplicius follows Iamblichus in almost all aspects of his analysis. In particular, Simplicius shares Iamblichus’ assumption that shape is ultimately caused by intelligible principles. Yet, Simplicius departs from Iamblichus position by asserting that shape is constituted by figure, color, and perhaps even other qualities. Iamblichus opposes this view, presumably because he takes it to interfere with his own metaphysical explanation of shape. Simplicius, however, suggests that his claim is in accord with Iamblichus’ assumptions. In his attempt to harmonize the ‘constitution thesis’ with Iamblichus’ theory of intelligible principles, Simplicius relies on the notion of σύνεληψις. He argues that shape as a common conjunction (κοινή σύνεληψις) includes the other qualities in question, albeit as its parts or elements different from itself.

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Jawdath Jabbour, *The Structure of Fārābī’s Contra Galen and His Epistle on Medicine* pp. 89-124

*Al-Radd ʿalā Ġālīnūs* is the only work of al-Fārābī entirely dedicated to his philosophical biology. The text as we know it today is composed of three independent epistles to which a fourth text should be added - his epistle on medicine - the content of which stems from various extracts from Ġālīnūs. This article, which we hope to be a first step in our project of a new commented edition of Ġālīnūs, aims at a better understanding of how this network of texts works as well as the history of its constitution, based on the structure of these texts, their ancient testimonies and on what the codices that contain them can reveal to us. Moreover, the study of the Risāla fi al-Ṭibb, of which we present a new edition, allows us to reflect upon the way the manuscript transmission has enabled the creation of new works out of the original works written by classical Arabo-Islamic philosophers.

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Silvia Di Vincenzo, *A Hidden Source? Considerations on Averroes’ Recourse to Avicenna’s Madḥal of the Šīfāʾ in the Middle Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge* pp. 125-136

The paper is a review of Roland Hissette’s critical edition of the Latin translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* published in 2016 within the framework of the ‘Averroes Latinus’ project. The analysis of Hissette’s edition offered the occasion of a further inquiry into a number of passages of Averroes’ Commentary, compared to their Hebrew translation edited by H. A. Davidson in 1969. As a result of this inquiry, the paper proposes the hypothesis that some relevant points of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* might resort to Avicenna’s major reworking on the Isagoge, the *Kitāb al-Madḥal* of the Šīfāʾ, as a source.

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Hugh Eterianus (ca. 1110/1120-1182), an Italian theologian who worked in Byzantium as an advisor to Manuel I Comnenos, is the author of the treatise De sancto et immortal deo, where he argues against the Orthodox denial of the filioque. In this treatise, Hugh quotes from the works of Plato, Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. In chapter I, 4, Hugh includes a short passage from a certain ‘Alexander’ who commented on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. We show that this passage is a fragment from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on the Posterior Analytics. This article includes a new edition of the fragment with an English translation and a philosophical commentary.

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Luigi Campi, God is the Rewarder not of Nouns but of Adverbs: Hunting Abelardian Ghosts pp. 155-190

The paper presents the results of an enquiry into the phrase « Deus est remunerator non nomen sed adverbiorum ». Although it had widespread circulation in the late Middle Ages and in early Modernity, this saying has been hitherto almost entirely overlooked by intellectual historians. Its earliest appearance is attested in Bernard of Parma’s Ordinary Gloss to the Gregorian Decretals (second recension, c. 1243-1245), where the phrase is ascribed, intriguingly enough, to «Io. quidam sapiens fantasma». After surveying some stages in the spread of this phrase, the paper addresses the question of its attribution. Eventually, the paper takes into closer consideration Bernard’s gloss and its textual components, and raises some questions concerning their connection with Abelard’s controversial ethical teaching.

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Francesco Binotto, Henry of Ghent: the Problem of Individuation and the Contingency of Creatures. Some Remarks on Question 8 of Quodlibet II, pp. 191-230

This paper examines Henry of Ghent’s account of individuation. Through the analysis of question 8 of Quodlibet II and other textual sources, the paper studies the connection between the theme of the individuation and that of the contingency of creatures. In particular, it will investigate Henry’s criticism of the so-called Aristotelian thesis, supported by Thomas Aquinas, according to which matter is the one and only principle of individuation. According to this thesis, in the case of angels, since they are devoid of matter, there are no multiple individuals in the same species, but rather species that are in themselves individual. For Henry, this statement entails that angels are necessary and divine beings. Differently from other scholars, we will show that Henry’s critical remarks concerning the connection between singularity and the divine nature of the angelic essences is grounded on the assumption that what multiplies an essence into many individual suppositis is, in fact, subsistence, i.e. individual existence. In other words, Henry’s criticism of Thomas Aquinas presupposes the thesis that subsistence is the proper cause of the individuation of an essence.

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Giacomo Fornasieri, *Peter Auriol on Connotative Distinction and His Criticism of Scotus’s Formal Distinction*, pp. 231-274

The aim of this paper is to outline Peter Auriol’s theory of connotative distinction as applied to the divine attributes and his criticism of Scotus’s formal distinction, as well. He mainly tackles this issue in two important texts: his *Scriptum* I, dist. 8, q. 3 and his *Quodlibet* q. 1. Although Auriol takes into account the opinions of various scholars on the matter, Scotus plays the role of the main debater in both texts. Accordingly, the first part of this article is devoted to a survey of Scotus’s formal distinction. This doctrine is certainly one of the most important of Scotus’s teachings. At the same time, it is one of the most problematic. It elicited radically different interpretations even among medieval scholars. In particular, it seems that differences between his teaching in Oxford and in Paris may have occasioned such a dispute. Auriol appears to be aware of such a difference. In the second section of this paper, I examine Auriol’s arguments against Scotus’s formal distinction. Finally, his solution to the problem of the distinction of the divine attributes is presented. On the one hand, Auriol cannot accept the formal distinction due to metaphysical reasons. On the other, he tries to elaborate a theory according to which attributes are not just conceptually distinct. To overcome this impasse, he claims that the attributes are connotative terms, that is they differ through what they connote.

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Chiara Paladini, *Essence and Being according to Peter Auriol*, 275-352

This study is aimed to investigate Peter Auriol’s theory of the distinction between being and essence. Late medieval Realists considered being and essence as two constitutive principles of the singular things; the former concerned the actual existence of the thing, the latter its nature or quiddity and was expressed by the definition of the thing. Auriol denies that the distinction between being and essence is a distinction between two ontological elements that taken together give rise to the singular things. Instead, for him this distinction is a distinction between two notions (concrete and abstract) of the same singular thing. These two notions derive from our mind’s two different ways of considering the same thing: through intuitive and abstractive cognitions. The combination in the mind of the two notions gives rise to the epistemological truths expressed by propositions. As a consequence, Auriol elaborates a new version of the theory of meaning and truth of both the existential and essential propositions, such as ‘Rosa est’ and ‘Sortes est homo’ respectively, where the abstract terms of our language do not signify pre-existing essences of things, but only their abstract concepts. Thus, in the first case, our mind derives the notion of the actual existence of a thing (expressed by ‘est’) from its abstract general notion (in our example the notion of rose). In the second, our mind combines two different notions of Socrates linked to the different ways of conceiving (modi concipiendi) him, intuitively and abstractively. Since these notions are not subjective modifications of the mind, but they coincide with the thing itself (the whole reality of Socrates) insofar as it is known, they refer to Socrates and to a state of affairs connected with him.

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Mario Bertagna, *Enthymematic Implication and the Medieval Theory of Consequences*, pp. 353-382

Medieval logicians inherited two different approaches to *loci*: on Boethius’s view a *locus* is a procedure for constructing a proof whose underlying argument is a syllogism; Abelard, by constrast, conceives of a *locus* as a device for proving that an enthymematic consequence is valid. In an effort to reconcile these two approaches, some XIIIth-
century authors made implicit use of the notion of enthymematic implication, according to which $p$ implies $q$ if and only if $q$ can be syllogistically deduced from $p$ and some proposition(s) belonging to a given set of background knowledge. The notion of an enthymematic implication also plays a major role in Burley’s theory of consequences; in particular, it lies at the heart of his distinction between natural and accidental consequences, and his identification of formal consequences with natural ones. This concept of formal consequence is undermined by Buridan’s discovery of the rule of inference according to which any proposition can be deduced from a pair of contradictories.

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Magali Roques, *Chaton on Extension*, pp. 383-414

This paper deals with Walter Chatton’s metaphysics of the continuum. Its aim is to explore how Chatton articulates three core notions of medieval natural philosophy, namely, extension, divisibility, and impenetrability. Chatton opposes the majority of his contemporaries in denying that an extended body is infinitely divisible. He defends the view that a continuum is composed of a finite number of indivisibles, a position that was usually associated with Democritus’s atomism at the beginning of the fourteenth century. However, Chatton believes that his redefinition of the concept of a continuum entails that a composite made up of indivisibles is not the result of their congregation by means of random local motions. Against Democritus, he supports the core idea of Aristotelian hylomorphism, namely, that substantial changes such as generation and corruption are not reducible to local motion. Moreover, Chatton holds that the possibility of two bodies being in the same place at the same time is not ruled out by the nature of a body. He distinguishes two conceptions of impenetrability that were conflated by his main adversary William of Ockham, namely, impenetrability as the capacity to resist another body, and impenetrability as a spatial relation between the parts of a body and the parts of the space it occupies. This confirms his rejection of any kind of mechanism, according to which the universe is reducible to the motion and collision of fundamental elements, such as atoms or the parts of matter.

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This paper analyzes the particular notion of the conceptual distinction as elaborated by Alphonsus Vargas in his *Questions on Aristotle’s De Anima*, when he addresses the question whether the powers of the soul are really distinct among themselves. Vargas emphatically rejects the formal distinction, both in his *Questions on the De Anima* in a discussion with the Scotist Gerald of Odo, and in his Sentences Commentary (1344-45) in a discussion with Scotus and some of the latter’s followers. According to Vargas the formal distinction inevitably comes down to a real distinction. Leaning heavily on ideas expounded in the first Quodlibet of his confrère James of Pamiers, Vargas proposes another kind of distinction, to be applied to the relation between the powers of the soul and between the divine attributes. The proposed distinction is conceptual but made necessary by the nature of the thing (*distinctio rationis ex natura rei necessitantis*). This paper offers a detailed analysis of the meaning and applications of this distinction in Vargas’s *Questions on the De Anima* and *Sentences Commentary*. The distinction appears not to have met much response. Two centuries later Andreas Bodenstein Karlstadt includes it in his comparative review of the various distinctions developed by Thomists and Scotists, equating it with the conceptual distinction *cum fundamento in re*. I conclude that Vargas in fact relegates the work done by Scotus’s formal distinction to his own brand of the conceptual distinction. The former, which for Scotus is less than fully real, has for Vargas still too much of reality; his own conceptual distinction mirrors the formal distinction by moving away from the other end of the scale: it is less than fully conceptual. In both cases, however, the relevant distinction is meant to be located at some distance from the theoretically possible endpoints ‘fully real’ and ‘fully conceptual’.

During the 13th and 14th centuries, the question of scientificity of theology launched a wide debate on the nature of science and its object. In particular, William Ockham’s proposal concerning the object of a scientific knowledge was at the origin of a lively debate that, began in Oxford from the second decade of 1300, concerned the meaning of a proposition (*complexum*). In this context tension-filled and intellectually challenging, Hugolin of Orvieto, an Hermit friar of St. Augustin, in 1348-49 defended his personal interpretation of *significabile complexe*. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the first two articles of the first question of the Prologue of his *Commentary on the Sentences*, devoted to knowledge of *verum theologicum*, in which the Hermit Master exposes the basis of his theory of knowledge placed into a perspective inspired by St. Augustin.

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Edit Anna Lukács, «Contali cum magistro meo reverendo Nicholao de Dinkelspuhel in tribus principiis meis»: The Principia by Walter of Bamberg OCarm (1400-1402), pp. 479-504

This paper contains a detailed presentation of Wien, ÖNB, Cod. 4127’s last part, which transmits the principal lectures on the *Sentences* by Walter of Bamberg OCarm. Walter of Bamberg, who commented on the work of Peter Lombard at the University of Vienna in 1400-1402, conducts the disputational parts of his *principia* — the *articuli collativi* — against two concurrently reading bachelors, Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl and Michael Suchenschatz. Through Bamberg’s quotations, we can not only date with precision Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl’s academic lecture on the *Sentences*, but also gain insight into three of the four, now lost *principia* of Dinkelsbühl, and the first principal debate integrally transmitted from the Viennese Faculty of Theology, on beatific vision.

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