The present study focuses on Albert the Great’s reception of Arabic sources - especially of Avicenna - in his commentary on the Isagoge, i.e., the Super Porphyrium de V Universalibus. The paper is articulated into two main sections (I and II) and six appendixes (A-F). The first section (I) offers a preliminary evaluation of Albert’s use of Arabic sources in the SP. The second section (II) aims to assess Avicenna’s impact on Albert from the viewpoint of his doctrinal digressions. Two major doctrines of Avicenna are integrated into Albert’s theory of the predicables: first, the Avicennian distinction between an ontological consideration of the predicables, which pertains to metaphysics, and a logical one, which pertains to logic; second, Avicenna’s redefinition of the epistemological status of logic, which is reassessed as a science in its own right with its own subject-matter, ceasing to be considered as a mere instrument for the other sciences. Both points were crucial to the thirteenth-century debate on the subject-matter of logic and the universal predicables: a comparison between Albert the Great’s and Robert Kilwardby’s treatments of these themes shows that Albert might have engaged in a debate with his colleagues which has gone unnoticed so far. It is argued that the recourse to Avicenna has provided Albert with a set of arguments which, assimilated and rearranged in his theory of the universal predicables, enabled him to elaborate original answers to the problems differently faced by his contemporaries.

Silvia Di Vincenzo, IMT Scuola Alti Studi Lucca
silvia.divincenzo@imtlucca.it

Bruno Tremblay, Albert the Great on What Should Be Known About Substance Before Reading Categories, 5 pp. 57-130

Prior to tackling the chapter on substance contained in Aristotle’s Categories, Albert the Great inserts into his commentary (De praedicamentis) a review of a few meanings of the word “substance” that he says are key to understanding the text to come: substance as the first created thing, substance as the supreme genus of the first category, and substance as the concretely-existing individual. Albert’s preliminary dis-
Bruno Tremblay, St. Jerome’s University, Canada
btrembla@uwaterloo.ca

Mario Bertagna, Some Notes on Albert the Great’s Companion to the Prior Analytics pp. 131-58

Albert the Great’s companion to the Prior Analytics has never enjoined high reputation, even among his contemporaries, for it is heavily dependent on Kilwardby’s commentary. However, sometimes Albert seems to be able to clarify obscure points in Kilwardby, and he departs from him on a number of relevant and disputed topics. In this article I discuss Albert’s proof of the validity of the assertoric Barbara and his discussion of the puzzle of the two modal Barbaras in order to show that, far from being a mere rearrangement of ideas already present in Kilwardby’s commentary, Albert’s companion contains appreciable elements of novelty, and it is worth studying as an independent work.

Mario Bertagna
mariobergagna@alice.it

Silvia Donati, Albert the Great’s Treatise De intellectu et intelligibili: A Study of the Manuscript and Printed Tradition pp. 159-264

Albert the Great’s work De intellectu et intelligibili is a short psychological treatise written by the Dominican master in the second half of the 1250s or between the second half of the 1250s (Bk I) and the beginning of the 1260s (Bk II). It is part of Albert’s project of a philosophical encyclopedia, developed according to the principles of Peripatetic philosophy, a project that starts around 1250 with the commentary on the Physics. The treatise investigates the origin and the nature of the intellective soul (Bk I tr. 1), the object and the nature of the intellectual activity (tr. 2 and 3, respectively), and the process of perfection that the intellective soul undergoes in this life through
the exercise of the intellectual activity (Bk II). Dealing with the intellect and its activity, the *De intellectu et intelligibili* addresses a topic which is not covered by a specific treatise within the body of Aristotle's psychological writings, but was a central focus of the later Peripatetic speculation - a philosophical tradition from which Albert obviously takes inspiration in his treatise. Albert's *De intellectu et intelligibili* was very influential on the late-medieval noetic speculation. This study analyses the structure of its very wide manuscript and printed tradition, outlining the results of an investigation carried out in the context of the preparation of the critical edition of the treatise.

Silvia Donati, Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Bonn
slv.donati@gmail.com

§

Katja Krause, *Grenzen der Philosophie: Alberts des Großen Kommentar zu De animalibus und die Medizin* pp. 265-94

Traditionally scientific boundaries were determined by subject matter and/or method. The latter was particularly useful when two sciences covered the same subject matter, as was the case, to a great extent, with the ensouled human body in the Aristotelian science of the *De animalibus* on the one hand and in theoretical medicine on the other. Although Albert the Great (1200-1280), the medieval natural philosopher par excellence, knew about Avicenna’s methodological division of these two sciences from Latin translations of his writings, he ultimately decided to go his own ways in the *De animalibus*. Indeed, thanks to his epistemic commitments to Aristotelian demonstration, Albert decided instead to integrate the traditional medical subject matters of anatomy and physiology into his *scientia De animalibus*. How exactly he did so, what his precise motivations were, and what the consequences his integrations had, are discussed in this paper.

Katja Krause, Max-Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Technische Universität Berlin
kkrause@mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de

§

Amos Bertolacci, *Albert the Great’s Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Paraphrases: A Reconsideration* pp. 295-338

Building on previous scholarship, the present article pursues three interrelated aims. First, the various typologies of statements that J. A. Weisheipl and subsequent scholarship record cumulatively under the general rubric of ‘disclaimers’ in Albert’s com-
mentaries on Aristotle are distinguished, with the intent of assessing the various conceptual layers that reside within these contentions, and of narrowing this label, *stricto sensu*, only to some of them. Second, the evidential basis of the dossier on this topic is enlarged, by means of textual evidence merely mentioned, scarcely considered, or even completely overlooked before, in the footsteps of the most recent critical editions of Albert’s paraphrases and of the indexes and the lexica complementing the critical texts. Third, the possible origin of this motif of Albert’s Aristotelian commentaries is explained, in a double direction: on the one hand, the first emergence of this topic is precisely located within Albert’s production, pointing at the subsequent evolution of Albert’s stance on this issue; on the other hand, the historical ancestry of the disclaimers is retrieved within the Aristotelian and Peripatetic tradition, in such a way that this aspect of Albert’s exegesis of Aristotle reinforces, rather than diminishing or jeopardising, the author’s advocacy of the Peripatetism that he is expounding in the commentaries.

Amos Bertolacci, IMT Scuola Alti Studi Lucca
amos.bertolacci@imtlucca.it

Henryk Anzulewicz, *Zum anthropologischen Verständnis der Perfectio bei Albertus Magnus* pp. 339-70

Albert assigns a systemically and hermeneutically important function to the concept of perfection as the centerpiece of his onto-theological reflexive structure of *exitus – perfectio – reductio*. With this reflexive model, he explains reality in its emergence from its transcendent origin, in its realization in the space, time and matter, and in its return to the transcendent goal, which is identical with the origin and thought of as God Himself. Albert modifies and adapts Proclus’ insight of the unfolding of reality from its transcendent origin, the One or the Good metaphysically, teleologically and ethically by means of the concept of the *perfectio*, which he derived from Ps.-Dionysius the Areopagite and the Pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle. This contribution reflects on the anthropological dimension of *perfectio* as central structural element of the Neoplatonic model of thinking which Albert Christianises.

Henryk Anzulewicz,
Albertus-Magnus-Institut, Bonn
henryk.anzulewicz@gmail.com
Anna Rodolfi, *Alberto Magno e il problema del movimento degli angeli* pp. 371-98

The topic of the movement of angels is one of the testing grounds of the impact that the notions coming from Aristotelian physics had on the theological thought in the XIIIth century. The angel has no matter nor dimensions, and this seems to deny the possibility to conceive its motion and place in terms of Aristotelian physics. For a theologian, however, the angelic movement was established by many biblical places, testifying that the angels actually move from one place to another as divine ministers, to fulfill their mission. This article aims at reconstructing the doctrine of the movement of angels elaborated by Albert the Great in some of his main works, from the *Summa de creaturis* (1242-1245) to the first part of the *Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei* (post 1268). Is it possible for Albert to speak in a proper sense of motion for angels? Can we formulate a rational explanation of the angelic movement consistent, or at least compatible with Aristotelian physics? In order to answer these questions, Albert reconsidered some of the Aristotelian requisites for movement, such as divisibilitas or indigentia, trying to show the possibility to refer them to the case of angels, at least in a weak or relative meaning. Finally, this analysis could provide some new elements to discuss the question if Albert was one of the targets of the articles about angelic place and movement in Tempier’s Condemnation of 1277.

Anna Rodolfi, Università di Firenze
anna.rodolfi@unifi.it

§

Alfonso Quartucci, *“Cavendus est error Platonis”: Albert the Great on the Mathematical Foundation of Physics* pp. 399-442

In several places of his works, Albert the Great maintains that metaphysics should provide the foundation of particular sciences. In this framework Albert also includes a criticism of an error he ascribes to Plato: in Plato’s view, Albert reports, physical realities would be grounded on mathematical ones. On the other hand, Albert himself, while denying that physical realities may be grounded on mathematical ones, seems to maintain that mathematics enjoys an objective priority over physics. In this article I try to provide an interpretation of Albert’s criticism of Plato and to explain how Albert’s own view differs from the one he labels ‘Plato’s error’.

Alfonso Quartucci, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
alfonso.quartucci@sns.it

§

The aim of the present contribution is to examine the edition of the *Tractatus tertius* of Avicenna’s *Physics* in the Šif’. The text is a Medieval Latin translation edited by Jules Janssens for the series *Avicenna Latinus*. I present an overview of this volume focusing on all its principal components: the critical edition properly speaking, seen in the light of the peculiarities of this Latin translation, and the three apparatuses that accompany the text. Particular attention is given to the apparatus of notes, which prove to be very useful for the study of this text from both a philological and a doctrinal point of view. The last section of this contribution examines whether this *Tractatus tertius* had any influence on Albert the Great’s commentary on the *Physics*. This analysis will show that there are no elements in Albert’s work to affirm a reception of it. This result is in line with the editor’s view about the limited influence of the *Tractatus tertius* on later Latin authors.

Alessia Astesiano,  
Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa  
alessia.astesiano@sns.it

§

Marco Signori, “Ut limpidius hoc clarescat”. *A Survey of al- azl’s Quotations in Albert the Great’s Works* pp. 471-624

This article presents an overall analysis of the explicit quotations of the Arabicspeaking theologian and philosopher Abmid al- azl (Latin Algazel) in Albert the Great’s entire work. The quotations, which are taken from the *Summa theoricae philosophiae* (the Latin translation of al- azl’s Arabic work *Maq id al-falsafa*) are classified on typological grounds, and thus subdivided in nominal or indeterminate, doctrinal or textual, *verbatim* or paraphrastic quotes. The article discusses the different forms of the name employed by Albert to reference al- azl; the tight link between al- azl and Avicenna established in Albert’s works; the other *auctores* - both classical and medieval - that appear associated to Algazel in Albert’s quotations. Thanks to a discussion of the diversified indeterminate expressions that Albert employs when referring to al azl, the paper will also delineate his identity as it emerges from Albert’s writings. The article will also analyse the distribution of Albert’s quotations as to the three different sections of al- azl’s *Summa - Logica, Metaphysica, and Physica* – showing the continuity of Albert’s interplay with Algazel all along his work. The conclusions will raise some further questions about the cases escaping the general framework sketched in the article, i.e. the quotations which seem to describe Algazel in non-standard ways
and could thus open new fields of inquiry concerning al-azl's Latin reception. The Appendix will provide a comprehensive table of the 335 explicit citations of al-azl that are to be found in Albert's work.

Marco Signori, Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa
marco.signori@sns.it

§

Adam Takahashi, Albert the Great as a Reader of Averroes: A Study of His Notion of the Celestial Soul in De Caelo et Mundo and Metaphysica pp. 625-54

In this paper I will explain why Albert the Great appealed to the notion of the celestial soul or intellect, going beyond Aristotle's original arguments. To this purpose, instead of pursuing the inner logic of his arguments, I will examine how he used Averroes' commentaries, especially in the former's paraphrases of Aristotle's On the Heavens and Metaphysics. Furthermore, in order to explain why the notion of the celestial soul or intellect was crucial for both authors, I will highlight an intellectual tradition going back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, in which the notion of the celestial intellect was closely linked to divine providence. I will conclude that Alexander's cosmological doctrine as presented by Averroes led Albert to expand Aristotle's notion of the animation of the heavens in his account of celestial motion and the influence of celestial bodies.

Adam Takahashi,
Faculty of Philosophy, Toyo University, Tokyo
adam.takahashi@gmail.com

§

Gregory T. Doolan, Aquinas's Methodology for Deriving the Categories: Convergences with Albert's Sufficientia Praedicamentorum pp. 655-90

This paper examines the methodology employed by Thomas Aquinas in his two derivations of the categories, or sufficientiae. In these accounts, he shows the distinctiveness of the ten Aristotelian categories as modes of being (modi essendi) through an analysis of modes of predication (modi praedicandi). The paper considers why Aquinas sees this logical method of predication (via praedicationis) to be an appropriate tool for the metaphysician. Similarities between Aquinas's and Albert's sufficientiae are shown to clarify Aquinas's methodology. In particular, the paper
examines how both thinkers employ modes of denominative predication and modes of opposition to derive the categories. The paper not only reveals Aquinas’s full methodology in his *sufficientiae*, but it also provides further insight into how he uses logical methods in general in his metaphysical investigations.

Gregory T. Doolan,
The Catholic University of America
doolan@cua.edu

§

David Zettel, *Moral Action in Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas* pp. 691-720

Tobias Hoffmann argues that Albert the Great’s account of the morality of actions is “too closely tied to the ontological viewpoint”. On his telling, Albert focuses too heavily on actions as ontological items, neglecting their specifically moral character. This is evident, Hoffmann thinks, from Albert’s claim that goodness and badness are only accidental to action. He contrasts Albert with Thomas Aquinas, for whom goodness and badness are essential characteristics of actions, and for whom an act’s end takes precedence over its object. I argue that Albert is much closer to Aquinas than Hoffmann supposes, for three reasons. First, Albert claims that goodness and badness are accidental to individual actions, not that they are accidental to moral species. Since Aquinas claims only that good and bad diversify *species* in human actions, there is no conflict with Albert. Second, Albert holds that goodness and badness are accidental to actions because the moral character of an action derives not only from what is essential to it, but also from its circumstances; the same reasoning is found in Aquinas. Finally, far from profoundly altering Albert’s account, Aquinas’ focus on the end as key to an act’s ethical dimension is quite similar to Albert’s position, particularly as expressed in his *Super Ethica*.

David Zettel
davezettel@gmail.com

§

Paola Bernardini, “*Plus quam specie differt*”. *La formazione dell’essere umano in Alberto Magno e nei commenti aristotelici dei maestri delle arti* (1240-1270 ca.) pp. 721-54

This essay discusses the meaning of Albert the Great’s statement “*homo solus est intellectus*”, through which he warns not to conceive of the human being as an animal different from the irrational ones *just by species*. This thesis - not entirely in line with Aristotelianism, as it seems - becomes clear when placed in its proper historical and
doctrinal context, and compared with the anthropological doctrines of some contemporary Masters of Arts. First of all, such a comparison highlights the differences in understanding the sources, especially as far as some crucial passages of Aristotle and Averroes are concerned (“Solus intellectus egreditur ab extrinseco”; “Membra leonis non differunt a membris cervi, nisi propter diversitatem animae leonis ab anima cervi”). Albert’s real intention is not only to offer a conception of man in line with Christian faith and tradition, but also to reaffirm a correct reading of Aristotle, against the erroneous interpretations of the Masters (called by him Platonists and Pythagoreans). In Albert’s opinion, these latter have actually misunderstood the meaning of the role played by nature and by God in the process of the human generation.

Paola Bernardini, Università di Siena
bernardinip@unisi.it