

ABSTRACT

Costantino Marmo - Francesco Bellucci *Lac habet, ergo peperit: History of an Example* 1-34

In this paper we trace the history of the example of *tekmerion* or first-figure signsyllogism contained in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* (II, 27) : the fact that a woman has milk in the breast is the sign that she has given birth. This example, either in its original Aristotelian version or in some remodeling of it, is found in virtually every logical department of Western Aristotelism, from late antiquity to the thirteenth century, and its occurrence is functional to the illustration of distinct, and sometimes conflicting, logical doctrines.

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Sebastiano Belleggia *Being in Something, Being in Itself: Philosophical Perspectives on Physics, IV, 3 in Late Antiquity and Middle Ages* 35-67

In *Physics*, IV, 3, Aristotle lists eight ways of 'being in something else' (parts in their whole, whole in its parts, species in its genus, genus in its species, form in matter, something moved in its primary mover, some-

thing in its end, in a place) and then proves that, although something can be *by part* in itself, nothing can be in itself *primarily* nor by *accident*. When dealing with Aristotle's list, ancient and medieval commentators of Physics have attempted to find a common pattern within the ways of 'being in' and in doing so they have provided some insightful remarks about the notions involved. Moreover, Aristotle's proof has been under considerable scrutiny because of the obscurity of some sections, particularly the sub-proof that nothing can be in itself by *accident*, about which Philoponus and Simplicius show peculiar deviations from its Standard Interpretation. Finally, this passage has been debated because of the threat it poses to the theory of ideas, which cannot but be in themselves. In this respect, Simplicius provides a fascinating example of how Neoplatonic philosophers could have eluded Aristotle's proof in order to save the ontological status of Forms. In doing so, Simplicius sets forth interesting observations about the different nature and properties of corporeal and incorporeal wholes.

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Sokratis-Athanasios Kiosoglou «*Every Manifold in Some Way Participates the One*» or Rather «*Unity*»? On Elements of Theology, § 1 69-92

The present paper focuses on Proclus' conception of the « one » in the first theorem of his *Elements of Theology*. It defends the view that Proclus does not already refer to the absolute One, but rather to internal unity as a condition for the existence of manifolds. This reading is aligned with the dialectical interpretation of the work and the conventions pertaining to the literary genre of *Elementatio*, but is also supported, as the third section shows, by a close textual analysis of certain qualifiers that Proclus inserts in his first proposition. My claim in the next two sections is that this interpretation of the « one » as « unity » is already endorsed in the work of Berthold of Moosburg and Marsilio Ficino. Although both depend on Moerbeke's translation, they do not necessarily refer exclu-

sively to the absolute One, since their conception of the « one » is sensitive to the principle of internal unity.

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Fedor Benevich *Personal Identity in the Philosophy of Kalām* 93-114

How can I guarantee that I am the same person that I was thirty years ago? A common view among the historians of philosophy is that medieval philosophy offered two kinds of replies to this question, either Aristotelian hylomorphism or Platonic substance dualism. In this paper, I am analysing a third medieval alternative, present in the philosophy of the Basran Mu‘tazilite *kalām*, a completely physicalist theory of personal identity. According to this school of thought, the person is what can be called a ‘substantial compound’ that emerges from the combination of core physical elements. This compound is necessarily identical with the person in question (I call this theory ‘bundle essentialism’) and, hence, is responsible for the preservation of personal identity.

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Marwan Rashed *Abū al-Farağ Ibn al-Tayyib, Traité des rêves et de la distinction entre rêve valide et rêve invalide selon la doctrine des philosophes* 115-56

This article presents the *editio princeps*, translation and commentary of a hitherto unknown treatise by an Arab philosopher contemporary and rival of Avicenna, Abū al-Farağ Ibn al-Tayyib. Dedicated to the question of the nature of dreams, this text enables us to understand how the psychology of

dreams and divine inspiration that developed first with al-Kindī, then with al-Fārābī, took on a new form around 1000 AD, when al-Fārābī's doctrine was bent in the direction of a clear subordination of divine inspiration in general to philosophical prophecy. In this context, it is not irrelevant that the author is a Christian, and that he can, and indeed must, unlike Muslim philosophers, extract Jesus Christ from the line of prophets.

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Marco Signori *The Liminary Texts of al-Ġazālī's Maqāsid al-falāsifa. A Specimen of English Translation of the Prologue, Epilogue and Prefaces, with Philosophical and Philological Commentary* 157-208

This article offers the first English translation, with a doctrinal and philological commentary, of all the liminary texts of Abū Hāmid al-Ġazālī's *Maqāsid al-falāsifa* [*The Intentions/Doctrines of the Philosophers*]. Under the label of 'liminary texts' I consider the well-known Prologue of the entire *summa*, its brief Epilogue, as well as the individual prefaces to the three main sections of the work, respectively devoted to logic, metaphysics, and natural philosophy. This choice of texts aims at offering an overview of the contents, style, and main theoretical concerns of al-Ġazālī's encyclopaedia, which encompasses Avicenna's version of Peripatetic philosophy in a nutshell. After a brief methodological presentation, the article provides an introduction to each of these prefatory or conclusive texts, their Arabic-English translation, and a running commentary on each of them, which addresses the main issues they raise with respect to text, context, doctrine, sources, and reception (with special reference to the medieval Latin translation of the work). The article is concluded by an Appendix providing a novel *divisio textus* of the *Maqāsid* into 455 paragraphs, used for reference throughout the commentary.

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Paola Bernardini *An Unpublished Question on the Unicity of the Intellect (Adam de Whitby ?)* (ms. Praha Archív Pražského hradu, fond Rukopisy knihovny Metropolitní kapituly u sv. Víta M.80, ff. 66rb, l. 44 - 66vb, l. 19) 209-46

This article discusses the unpublished question on the unicity of the possible intellect attributed to Adam de Whitby and transmitted as part of the *De anima* anthology in ms. Praha Archív Pražského hradu, fond Rukopisy knihovny Metropolitní kapituly u sv. Víta M.80, ff. 66rb, l. 44-66vb, l. 19. More specifically, the article examines the question's arguments for and against the unicity of the intellect, in an attempt to identify its sources and reconstruct its circulation, in such a way as to set the text in its historical-philosophical context (ca. 1260). A transcription of the question is provided as an appendix.

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Francesco Binotto *Thomas Aquinas and Siger of Brabant on External Impediments, Fallible Causes, and Contingent Effects* 247-80

In this paper I provide a fresh comparison between Thomas Aquinas's and Siger of Brabant's accounts of contingency in nature. My focus is on two points : (i) the explanation of the contingency of a cause ; (ii) the role of secondary causes in determining the contingency of effects. With respect to (i), I prove, in contrast to some scholars, that Aquinas explains the contingency of a cause by appealing not only to external impediments, but also to its intrinsic nature. I also argue that Siger unambiguously claims that the contingency of a cause depends on its impedeable nature. With respect to (ii), I prove that : Aquinas does not consider secondary causes to be a sufficient condition for fully explaining the contingency of effects, since what ultimately determines the contingent status of an

effect is God's will ; Siger instead denies that the First Cause contributes to determining the contingency of an effect and, as a result, he attributes to the secondary impeded causes the role of a sufficient condition for justifying their contingent status.

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Juan Eduardo Carreño *The Scholastic Model of Angelic Agency on the Corporeal World and the Condemnations of 1277* 281-310

The scholastic scheme that emerges during the thirteenth century to explain angelic action on the corporeal world - according to which the separate substance can induce a variety of effects, all of them mediated by local movement - rests on a series of philosophical assumptions that go back to Aristotle's *Physics*. As a result of the Condemnations of 1277, these assumptions are subjected to extensive revision in the following decades, but curiously, the thesis that the angel affects the supralunar and/or sublunar bodies through local displacement continues until well into the seventeenth century. With modernity, this somewhat anomalous situation came to an end. In the new worldview, angels no longer seem to have a definite causal role, a fact that undoubtedly precedes the cultural and even theological marginalization of a reality that constitutes an integral part of the Christian faith. This article explores some aspects of this conceptual shift and the challenges it still poses today for those who want to develop a coherent explanation of angelic agency.

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Silvia Donati *Matter, Potency and Being in some English Commentaries on the Physics : Oxford (?) ca. 1275-1300* 311-60

This paper is devoted to the debate on the ontological status of matter in a group of English commentaries on the *Physics* that were probably composed at the Oxford Faculty of Arts in a period between the last decades of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th century, among them the commentary by Thomas Wylton, a master active at Oxford before moving to Paris in 1304. From this investigation, a consistent view has emerged. It is clearly indebted to Averroes' and Aquinas' positions and also probably influenced by debates that took place in late 13th century at the Parisian Faculty of Arts and between followers and critics of Thomas' view, but it also shows original elements. Centered on the notion of matter as pure potentiality, the commentators' view is especially characterized by the assimilation between matter and another entity with a weak ontological status, namely accidental being. The notion of analogy of attribution is the conceptual tool they use to describe the parasitic being of both kinds of entities.

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Christian Rode *Giles of Rome on Political Naturalism and the Deficient Human Being* 361-84

This article deals with the political naturalism of Giles of Rome. It shows that Giles' political naturalism is multi-layered. On the one hand, he appeals to man as a biological deficient being, on the other hand, to man's rational nature and linguistic ability, which goes hand in hand with moral decision-making ability. Both moments are supposed to prove that man is a political animal. The first form of naturalism goes back to Avicenna's and Nemesius of Emesa's anthropology, the second form refers back to Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 2. Finally, Giles refers to nature, insofar as, according to him, a city or a kingdom arises naturally, through population growth,

from households and villages. Giles thus adds the vegetative and sensory nature of man to the basal biology and the rational nature. In the emergence of a political community, it is primarily the minimalist biological reasoning that plays a role ; once the state has come into being, the moral aspect is added. But unlike in Aquinas' *De regno*, in a complete *regnum*, the minimalist and maximalist descriptions coexist as stages, each with its own right. Giles' naturalism is thus - contrary to what is sometimes claimed in the secondary literature - not homogeneously Aristotelian but combines Avicennian with Thomistic and Aristotelian elements.

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Viola Tosi *Truth and Human Intellect in John of Naples' Quaestiones disputatae* 385-424

The present contribution concerns the conception of truth of John of Naples, which is discussed in his *Quaestiones disputatae*, q. XXXI. In the discussion, the notions of subjectivity and objectivity are crucial in relation to the possibility for truth to exist in the human intellect (*subjective in intellectu* or *objective in intellectu*). Many Dominican authors coeval to John place truth objectively in the intellect ; John, by contrast, holds an unusual position for the Order, for which truth exists both subjectively and objectively in the intellect, with a particular focus on the subjective side and on the role played by intellectual acts. This contribution proposes a reconstruction of John's doctrine of truth, his use of the terms '*subjective*' and '*objective*' with respect to truth, his purposes, and the link with Thomas Aquinas' doctrine. A comparison with the positions of other authors such as Henry of Ghent, Hervaeus Natalis and Durand of Saint-Pourçain will help to bringing to light the key points of John's doctrine.

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